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Abstract:  
We investigate the nature and extent of reallocation occurring within the Indian income 
distribution, with a particular focus on the dynamics of the bottom of the distribution. We argue 
that income evolution is appropriately modelled using Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). 
Specifically, we use the mechanism of GBM with a reallocation parameter that quantifies the 
extent and direction of reallocation in the distribution, as proposed by Berman et al. We find 
that since the early 2000s reallocation is negative, meaning that incomes are exponentially 
diverging and that there is a perverse redistribution of resources from the poor to the rich. It is 
well known that inequality has been rising in India in the recent past, but the assumption has 
been that while the rich benefit more than proportionally from economic growth, the poor are 
also better off than before. Our work refutes this as we find that India has moved from a regime 
of progressive to regressive redistribution, where continued impoverishment of the poor is 
directly spurring multiplicative income growth of the rich. Outcomes from the model suggest 
that income shares of the bottom decile (~1%) and bottom percentile (~0.03%) are at historic 
lows. We characterize these findings in the context of increasing informalization of the 
workforce in the formal manufacturing and service sectors, as well as the growing economic 
insecurity of the agricultural workforce in India. Significant structural changes will be required 
to address this phenomenon. 
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1. Introduction 
We live in a time characterized by increasing anxiety about economic inequality (Ribeiro, 
2013; Oncu, 2013; Lyster, 2016; Kohut, 2011). Since the early 1980s, there has been a 
systematic growth of income inequality in nations across the world, and India has been no 
exception (Milanovic, 2016). And while significant attention has focused on India’s poverty 
alleviation effects over the past 40 years (World Bank, 2019; Dhongde, 2007; Ninan, 1994; 
Dev & Ravi, 2007; Deaton & Dreze, 2002; Kjelsrud & Somanathan, 2017), the rapid rise in 
inequality in the same period merits deeper examination, especially pertaining to the 
dynamics at the bottom of the distribution. Many studies on the Indian income distribution 
use consumption data as provided by the National Sample Survey (NSS) as the basis to study 
income inequality (Deaton & Dreze, 2002; Sarkar & Mehta, 2010), while others have 
attempted to construct the income distribution using multiple sources in addition to NSS 
expenditure data, such as income tax data, national accounts data from the Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO), and Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) household savings data (Ojha & 
Bhatt, 1964; Ahmed & Bhattacharya, 2017; Sinha, Pearson, Kadekodi, & Gregory, 2017; 
Banerjee & Piketty, 2005; Chancel & Piketty, 2019). Chancel and Piketty (2019), construct 
the longest (and most up-to-date) income inequality time series for India, from 1922 to 2015, 
using income tax data, NSS expenditure data, and the India Human Development Survey 
(IHDS) income data, providing us a picture of the longer-term temporal evolution of income 
inequality in India (Figure1). Income inequality shows a declining trend for the first three 
decades after independence, with the top 10% (1%) earning 36.7% (11.5%) of the total 
income in 1951 and 30.7% (6.7%) in 1981. The bottom 50% meanwhile see their income 
share increase from 20.6% to 23.5% in the same period. However, from the early 1980s, 
inequality has shown a sustained and steep increase, resulting in the top 10% (1%) earning 
56% (21%) of income in 2015, with the bottom 50% seeing their share reduce to 14.7% 
(Chancel & Piketty, 2019).  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of income inequality (1951 – 2015): The temporal evolution of inequality is 
represented through the shares of incomes owned by the top 1% (𝑆1%, red line), top 10% (𝑆10%, blue 
line), and bottom 50% (𝑆50%, green line) of the population. After top income shares declined until the 
early 1980s, they have sharply risen since then. Income shares of the bottom half have declined. 
Before we delve deeper into the dynamics of inequality in India, it is useful to contextualize 
the Indian experience within the broader global experience of inequality. Prior to the 
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Industrial Revolution, mean incomes in most countries were stagnant for many centuries 
(Alvarez-Nogal & Prados de la Escosura, 2013), but inequality waxed and waned over time 
as a consequence of idiosyncratic forces such as wars, discovery of new lands, and epidemics 
(Milanovic, 2016). The rise and fall of inequality around an essentially fixed mean income 
illustrates the fact that there was no systematic relationship between inequality and income. 
The industrial revolution however, appears to have fundamentally altered the dynamic 
between income and inequality in two significant ways (Milanovic, 2016). First, growing 
total national incomes meant that inequality had more 'space' to increase now than before, 
thereby allowing a small portion of the population very high incomes, while also ensuring 
that nobody was pushed below subsistence level. This notion of greater potential inequality 
on account of increasing total income has been formalized as the 'inequality possibility 
frontier', which is defined as the locus of maximum feasible inequality levels for different 
values of mean income (Milanovic, Lindert, & Williamson, 2011).  Second, after the 
Industrial Revolution there emerged a new relationship between mean income and inequality. 
Both mean income and income inequality, on average, displayed a rising trend over time. The 
structural change on account of shift in occupations from agriculture to industry as well as 
changes in patterns of living as captured in the rural to urban migration, drove inequality up 
as a consequence of capital being able to capture most of the gains of increasing total income 
at the expense of labour. It has been argued that income inequality always rises when the rate 
of return from capital is greater than the rate of economic growth (Piketty, 2014), and that it 
is only for the brief period in the middle of the 20th century that there is a decline in 
inequality, which is due to a special set of political circumstances such as education, taxation, 
workers movements, social security, as well as economic convergence (Milanovic, 2016; 
Piketty, 2014). This decline is apparent in the time evolution of inequality between the 
second world war and the 1980s - to illustrate, between 1955 and 1980, the share of income 
earned by the top 10% declined by 7% in the United States, 15% in France, 18% in the Soviet 
Union, and 19% in India (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2017; Chancel & 
Piketty, 2019; Novokmet, Piketty, & Zucman, 2017; Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, & Piketty, 
2017). However, post the 1980s, inequality has resumed its expected upward trend and 
Milanovic (2016) argues that we are currently witnessing yet another set of structural changes 
encompassing the communications and internet revolution that has resulted in a sectoral shift 
from industry to services, increased economic interconnectedness between countries, and 
weakened the labour movement on account of the dispersed nature of employment in the 
services industry. Again, capital has captured a large share of the increased total income, 
resulting in a rising trend of economic inequality in nations across the world, even as average 
incomes have continued rising. For instance, between 1995 and 2012 the total fraction of 
income earned by the top 10% has grown by almost 13% in South Africa, 15% in the US, 
25% in China, and 45% in India (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2017; 
Chancel & Piketty, 2019; Assouad, Chancel, & Morgan, 2018). 
While the evolution of income inequality in India appears to broadly follow global trends, it 
is important to recognize that constructing the income distribution for measurement of 
inequality in India presents specific and unique challenges. In order to construct an annual 
time series of income inequality for India, given the largely informal nature of the workforce 
(tax data only covers ~7% of the working population), incomes of over 90% of the population 
are generally estimated from NSS consumption data because regular income surveys do not 
exist (Chancel & Piketty, 2019; Bardhan, 2017). There are a number of challenges, such as 
under-reporting and under-sampling, in using NSS consumption data to estimate income 
inequality, in addition to the fact that the dynamics of these two distributions (consumption 
and income) may be quite different (Atkinson & Piketty, 2010). In their work estimating 
India’s income distribution from 1922 to 2015, Chancel and Piketty (2019) rely on tax data 
for the top of the distribution, but use income data from two IHDS surveys to compute 
income-consumption ratios, which forms their basis to construct income profiles from NSS 
consumption data. 
Studies of inequality generally tend to focus on the income shares of those at the top of the 
distribution (top 0.1%, top 1%, top 10% etc.), so as to understand the (often disproportionate) 
extent of economic growth they have garnered over time. Our primary interest, however, lies 
in understanding the nature and extent of reallocation occurring within the income 
distribution over time. We propose to use income inequality data to fit a stochastic model of 
income evolution and thereby construct a theoretically consistent estimation of redistribution 
inherent in the economy. We also seek to understand better the dynamics of the lowest end of 
the spectrum – the bottom decile and the bottom percentile of the income distribution. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings in the context of significant global and 
national trends impinging on the Indian economy. 
2. Model definition and specifications 
In order to contemplate appropriate models to simulate income growth over time, it is useful 
to go back to the systematic nature of the relationship between mean income and income 
inequality post the Industrial revolution (Milanovic, 2016; Piketty, 2014) – both quantities, 
on average, are found to rise over time. Given this framing of income dynamics, income 
evolution is well suited to be studied as a multiplicative growth process following Geometric 
Brownian Motion (GBM), which obtains a broadening lognormal distribution over time. 
Indeed, empirical studies of income distributions around the world suggest that multiplicative 
dynamics yielding exponential or log normal distributions are salient for the lower part of 
distributions, with power laws operational at the tails of the distribution (Banerjee, 
Yakovenko, & Di Matteo, 2006; Clementi & Gallegati, 2005; Drăgulescu & Yakovenko, 
2001; Souma, 2001). Beside income, many economic processes such as evolution of wealth 
and asset prices have been modelled as multiplicative processes (Bouchaud & Mezard, 2000; 
Vasicek, 1977; Berman, Peters, & Adamou, 2017; Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, & Moll, 2016).  
Using NSS consumption data for India (given the absence of income time series in India as 
discussed earlier), it was found that the distribution of consumption expenditures showed a 
lognormal body and a power law tail (Chatterjee, Chakrabarti, Ghosh, Chakraborti, & Nandi, 
2016; Ghosh, Gangopadhyay, & Basu, 2011). Also, when we study the evolution of mean 
(per capita) national income from 1947 to 2017, it is found to be reasonably approximated by 
an exponential function (Figure 2). 
 Figure 2: Evolution of mean per capita income (1947 – 2017): The temporal evolution of mean 
income (blue triangles, log scale) is well approximated by an exponential process (dashed black line) 
of the form 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜇(𝑡 − 𝑡0)], yielding 𝜇 = 0.0231. Time 𝑡0 = 0 represents 1947 and each subsequent 
unit time increment represents one additional year, until 2017. 
In this work, we propose to propagate individual incomes using a multiplicative growth 
process, with the objective of estimating the direction and quantum of redistribution 
occurring in the income distribution. Specifically, we use the Reallocating GBM (RGBM) 
methodology of Berman, Peters, and Adamou (2017), who analyse wealth dynamics under 
disequilibrium – i.e. without the assumption that rescaled wealth converges to a stationary 
distribution. Essentially, using the RGBM approach, we model income as a noisy 
multiplicative process following GBM, while incorporating a reallocation parameter (𝜏) to 
capture the transfer of income between individuals. The reallocation parameter in this model 
can be understood as a consolidated measure of reallocation in the economy, including all 
taxes and other redistributive mechanisms. Therefore, under the RGBM, the time-evolution 
of income comprises two mechanisms, namely growth and reallocation, and is modelled 
using the following stochastic differential equation (Berman, Peters, & Adamou, 2017) 
(Eq.1): 
𝑑𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑖) − 𝜏(𝑥𝑖 − 〈𝑥〉𝑁),            (1) 
where: 
〈𝑥〉𝑁 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                   (2) 
𝑑𝑥𝑖 is the change in income of individual 𝑖 over time period 𝑑𝑡. The first term 𝑥𝑖(𝜇𝑑𝑡 +
𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑖) is the growth term and the second one 𝜏(𝑥𝑖 − 〈𝑥〉𝑁)𝑑𝑡 is the reallocation term. In the 
growth term, the 𝜇𝑑𝑡 represents systemic growth (economic growth that affects all incomes), 
while the 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑖 represents idiosyncratic growth of the particular individual 𝑖’s income, with 
𝑑𝑊𝑖 specifically being the increment in a Wiener process, which is normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance 𝑑𝑡. 𝑥𝑖 is the income of 𝑖 at time 𝑡, while the parameters 𝜇 and 𝜎 stand 
for drift and volatility of income respectively. The reallocation term comprises the 
reallocation parameter 𝜏 applied to the net reallocation from individual 𝑖, which is the 
difference between the individual’s income 𝑥𝑖 and mean income 〈𝑥〉𝑁. 
Income inequality time series data for India (1922-2017) is obtained from the World 
Inequality Database (https://wid.world/country/india/). We use this data for the period from 
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1951, when India became a republic, until 2015. Specifically, the dataset provides annual 
estimates on incomes of the top 1%, 10% and bottom 50% of population as proportions of 
total national income – 𝑆1%, 𝑆10%, 𝑆50% respectively (Figure1). Our interest is in exploring the 
dynamics at the lower (poor) end of the distribution, and given that the (rich) Pareto tail of 
the distribution could possibly cover between 10% and 20% of the population (Ghosh, 
Gangopadhyay, & Basu, 2011), using either the 𝑆1% or 𝑆10% measures (both of which are 
likely in the power law tail) to fit this model would be inappropriate, because the stochastic 
differential equation for RGBM (Eq.1) models a lognormal distribution. Therefore, we use 
𝑆50%, which pertains to an income share (bottom 50%) within the lognormal portion of the 
distribution, as the appropriate measure to fit our model as described in the algorithm below. 
There are two parts to executing the RGBM procedure - first, we estimate drift (𝜇) and 
volatility (𝜎) of income; and second, we propagate the income dynamics in Eq.1.  
We obtain drift (𝜇) by estimating an exponential fit of the form 〈𝑥(𝑡)〉𝑁 =
〈𝑥(𝑡0)〉𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜇(𝑡 − 𝑡0)] for the evolution of mean per capita income over time from 𝑡0 =
1947 until 𝑡 = 2017, in 1-year increments. Figure 2 depicts this estimation, yielding 𝜇 =
0.0231.  
Any proxy used to estimate income volatility (𝜎) must ensure that it meaningfully relates to 
the bulk of the income distribution which comprises a large rural workforce dependent on 
agriculture, as well as a significant proportion of the urban workforce that works in the 
informal sector (Naik, 2009; Chand, Srivastava, & Singh, 2017). We look at a number of 
possible proxies to capture income volatility, such as wholesale prices of staple crops such as 
wheat and rice, wholesale price of common commodities like jaggery (gur) as well as the 
price of gold, which is a common investment in portfolios of most Indian households (RBI, 
2017). Data for crop and commodity prices was obtained from the Open Government 
Platform of Govt. of India (https://data.gov.in/) and gold prices were obtained from World 
Gold Council (https://www.gold.org/goldhub/data/price-and-performance). All of these 
prices are available at a weekly resolution (wheat, rice, jaggery prices are available for 20 
years 1993-2012; and gold prices for 41 years 1979-2019) and we compute volatility for each 
of each of these four individual price data sets. We estimate annualised 𝜎 for a given 
commodity as the standard deviation of weekly logarithmic changes of the prices, multiplied 
by (52 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑟)0.5. These annualised values are averaged to get a consolidated 𝜎 
pertaining to the commodity. Using this approach, we compute the following volatilities: 
𝜎(𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) = 0.08, 𝜎(𝑗𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦) = 0.13, 𝜎(𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡) = 0.14, 𝜎(𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑) = 0.17. For the purpose 
of our analysis, we therefore use 𝜎 = 0.15. We also present results for 𝜎 = 0.1 and 𝜎 = 0.2 
to assess sensitivity of dynamics to 𝜎 choice.  
Now that we have estimates for both 𝜇 and 𝜎, our objective is to reproduce the income shares 
of the bottom 50% (𝑆50%) by fitting a time series 𝜏(𝑡) - the value of the reallocation 
parameter over time. The income dynamics of the RGBM algorithm are executed as follows: 
1. initialise 𝑁 individual initial incomes from a lognormal distribution such that the modelled 
cumulative income of the bottom 50% of the population, 𝑆50%
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙(𝑡0), matches the observed 
value of 𝑆50%(𝑡0), i.e. 𝑆50%
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙(𝑡0) ≅ 𝑆50%(𝑡0); 2. once incomes have been initialized, each of 
the 𝑁 individual incomes are propagated using Eq. 1 for Δ𝑡 = 1, with the value 
of 𝜏(𝑡) chosen to minimize the difference: 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆50%
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙(𝑡 + Δ𝑡, 𝜏) − 𝑆50%(𝑡 + Δ𝑡)]; 3. Step 2 
is repeated till the end of the time-series in 2015 to get a full time series for 𝜏(𝑡). Table 1 lists 
the model parameters. 
Parameter Value 
Drift (𝜇) 0.0231 
Volatility (𝜎) 0.15 
Population (𝑁) 100,000 
Table 1: Model parameters 
Berman, Peters and Adamou (2017) find that the RGBM yields three distinct regimes of 
behaviour based on the nature of reallocation (positive, zero, or negative). Using parameters 
from Table 1 for drift and volatility in the Indian context, we test the model for positive, 
negative, and no reallocation with 𝜏 = +0.1;  0.0; −0.1 respectively (other parameters: 𝑁 =
1000, and 𝑥𝑖(𝑡0) = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁). For 𝜏 = 0 or no reallocation, the RGBM is simply 
the GBM, which does not converge to a stationary distribution in the long-time limit, and 
both mean income and income inequality increase continually over time (Figure 3a). Mean 
income shows growing divergence from the median over time. For 𝜏 > 0, or positive 
reallocation, which we expect to reflect the reality of most modern economies which have 
systems of taxation and redistribution, incomes disperse (which means that inequality may 
still increase despite redistribution) but remain confined around an increasing sample mean 
〈𝑥〉𝑁 (Figure 3b). The median of the distribution also rises over and remains close to the 
mean. As 𝜏 increases – indicating increasing redistribution from top to the bottom - the 
distribution is more closely held around the mean. For 𝜏 < 0 or negative reallocation, income 
is essentially redistributed from the poor to the rich (Figure 3c). In this regime, incomes 
diverge from the mean, and the reduction of incomes at the bottom directly contributes to 
growth of incomes of those at the top of the distribution. There is no stationary distribution as 
incomes diverge exponentially away from the mean.  
 
Figure 3: Simulated reallocation regimes. A: Zero reallocation (𝜏 = 0.0). This is simply the GBM 
where incomes follow a lognormal distribution. Mean income and income inequality increase over 
time. B: Positive reallocation (𝜏 = 0.1). Incomes disperse but stay around sample mean for finite 𝜏. 
Mean income increases with time. C: Negative reallocation (𝜏 = −0.1). Incomes diverge 
exponentially from the mean, no stationary distribution exists and redistribution occurs from the 
bottom to top of distribution. Black lines: Maximum and minimum incomes forming the income 
envelope. Blue line: Sample mean of incomes. Yellow line: Sample median of incomes. 
3. Results 
We execute the RGBM algorithm as described in Section 2 and find that the simulated 
income share of the bottom 50% of the population (Figure 4a, dotted green) is in close 
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accordance with the empirical data (Figure 4a, solid blue) over the entire time period under 
consideration. This close correspondence in fitting 𝑆50% is obtained by appropriate choice of 
the reallocation parameter time series (termed 𝜏50%). The temporal evolution of 𝜏50% reveals 
that reallocation is largely positive between 1951 and 2002, and then persistently negative for 
a decade, before showing a rise again (Figure 4b, solid blue). The transition from a positive to 
negative regime coincides with the onset of a steep 27.5% drop in the share of the bottom half 
of the population between 2002 and 2015 (Figure 4a). This suggests that since the early 
2000s, the income distribution has been diverging, which is a significant concern given that it 
means that income redistribution has left a progressive regime (reallocation from the rich to 
the poor) and entered a perverse regressive regime where incomes of the poor are being 
redistributed to the rich – essentially, impoverishment of individuals in the lower half of the 
distribution is driving income gains for those at the top of the distribution. As Berman, Peters, 
and Adamou (2017) state, this becomes an economy of debtors and creditors. 
 
Figure 4: Temporal evolution of income inequality and reallocation (1951-2015). A: Fraction of 
income belonging to the bottom 50% of population over time. Solid blue line: Actual Fraction of 
income owned by bottom 50% of population (𝑆50%). Dotted green line: Simulated fraction of income 
owned by bottom 50% of population as per reallocation rate 𝜏50%(𝑡). Dashed red line: Simulated 
fraction of income owned by bottom 50% of population as per effective reallocation rate, ?̃?50%(𝑡). 
The curve described by using ?̃?50% is closely aligned with the actual data, and the effective 
reallocation rate is therefore a meaningful measure of actual redistribution. B: Reallocation over time. 
Blue line: Reallocation Rate (𝜏50%) over time. Dashed red line: Effective Reallocation Rate (?̃?50%) 
over time. Effective reallocation rates ?̃?50%(𝑡) are positive for close to five decades from 1951 and 
then become negative from 2005. The dotted black line represents the year 2002, at which point the 
reallocation rate enters the negative regime and the income share of the bottom half begins showing a 
sharp decline. 
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It could be reasonably argued that the reallocation described by 𝜏50%(𝑡) in Figure 4b shows 
too much variability on an annual basis and that reallocation policies in an economy cannot 
possibly result in such sharp changes year on year. In order to address this and smooth the 
evolution of 𝜏(𝑡), we compute an effective reallocation rate (termed τ෤50%) as the 5-year 
moving average of 𝜏50% - i.e. at given time 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑦, the effective reallocation rate τ෤50%(𝑡𝑦) is 
the simple average of the reallocation rates at times 𝑡𝑦, 𝑡𝑦−1, . . , 𝑡𝑦−4. In order to verify that 
the effective reallocation rate ?̃?50%(𝑡) is still representative of the same income distribution 
as the simple reallocation rate 𝜏50% and not introducing any other systematic element, we use 
?̃?50%(𝑡) to propagate the initial income distribution and compute the resultant 
𝑆50%
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙(?̃?50%, 𝑡). Figure 4a (dashed red) plots the temporal evolution of 𝑆50%
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙(?̃?50%, 𝑡) and 
we see that it shows close alignment with 𝑆50%(𝑡). Therefore, the effective reallocation rate 
appears to be a meaningful measure of the actual redistribution occurring in the income 
distribution.  
Figure 4b (dashed red) shows the evolution of ?̃?50%, revealing that that income inequality 
essentially entered a new and persistent regime of negative reallocation in the mid-2000s, 
though a declining trend in reallocation is apparent since the 1980s. In order to verify the 
sensitivity of this result, we use the RGBM model to also estimate the effective reallocation 
rates ?̃?50%(𝑡) for 𝜎 = 0.1 and 𝜎 = 0.2 as well. In general, we see that the evolution of 
effective reallocation rate in all scenarios follows similar trends of rise and decline over time, 
with the only salient difference being the levels of the curves – the curve for 𝜎 = 0.2 is the 
higher (Figure 5a, dashed blue) and that for 𝜎 = 0.1 is lower (Figure 5a, dashed red) than our 
base case of 𝜎 = 0.15. In all cases, we find a declining trend of reallocation from the mid-
1980s, and even for 𝜎 = 0.2, reallocation drops to zero in the mid-2000s (Figure 5a). Overall, 
this suggests that the regime of negative reallocation observed post 2002 in our base case is a 
robust result.  
 
Figure 5: Sensitivity of effective reallocation and central tendencies of income distribution. A: 
Evolution of effective reallocation rates (?̃?50%) for different levels of income volatility. Black line: 
?̃?50% for 𝜎 = 0.15. Dashed red line: ?̃?50% for 𝜎 = 0.1. Dashed blue line: ?̃?50% for 𝜎 = 0.2. All paths 
show similar trends, just at different levels. B: Mean-Median ratio of rescaled income distribution 
(1951-2015). Incomes diverge and the mean pulls away from the median in the early 2000s. 
When we assess the evolution of mean and median of the rescaled income distribution, we 
find that both measures grew through 1951 to 2015, with the mean always higher than the 
median. However, when we look at the ratio of mean to median income over time, we find 
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that it declines from 1.48 to 1.42 between 1960 and 1983, but then it steadily grows to 1.5 by 
2000, before steeply rising to 1.75 by 2015, highlighting the divergent nature of the income 
distribution in recent times (Figure 5b).  
We elicit further proof of this phenomenon by tracking the evolution of income shares of 
each decile of the population over the period 1951 to 2015 (Figure 6a). Until 1983, we see 
evidence for progressive redistribution (income convergence) with income shares of the top 
income deciles decreasing and those of the bottom deciles increasing. As we move forward in 
time from 1983, we find that the bottom deciles own a decreasing share of income, and post 
2002 this rate of decline in income share worsens. From a peak income share of 2.7% in 
1983, the bottom decile (Decile 1) sees this decline to 2.1% in 2002, and then rapidly to 1% 
in 2015 (the corresponding shares for the bottom percentile – Percentile 1 - are 0.18%, 
0.13%, and 0.03%) (Figure 6b). We test the robustness of this result for the bottom decile by 
varying income volatility (𝜎 = 0.1 and 𝜎 = 0.2) and find that the extent of decrease in 
income share across these scenarios is in close agreement with the base case - income share 
of bottom decile in 2015 is 0.76% for 𝜎 = 0.1 and 1.16% for 𝜎 = 0.2, compared to 1% for 
base case (Figure 6b).  
It is important to point out that the rise in income share of the top decile (Decile 10) is 
underestimated here (actual share of top decile in 2015 is 56%, as against 42% from the 
model), because the model does not account for the power law operating at the tail of the 
income distribution as discussed previously. This means that the income shares of the middle 
40% (Deciles 2 – 5) are overestimated in our model. However, given that we fit the model 
based on income earned by the bottom 50%, our outcomes for that part of the distribution 
remain consistent. What this essentially means is that estimates of negative reallocation from 
our model are conservative and that actual redistribution is potentially even more regressive 
than apparent here. 
 
Figure 6. Temporal evolution of income shares by decile from 1951-2015. A: Share of income earned 
by each decile over time. We see mild convergence in incomes till 1983, and then a gradual 
divergence, which is heightened post 2002. Income share of the bottom decile shows the sharpest 
decline. B: Sensitivity of income shares to income volatility. Outcomes of income of bottom decile 
appear robust to assumptions about income volatility. Solid red line: Bottom decile (base case). 
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Dotted black line: Bottom decile (𝜎 = 0.1). Dashed black line: Bottom decile (𝜎 = 0.2). Solid green 
line: Income share of bottom percentile (base case). 
Overall, the decline in income shares is apparent across each of the bottom 5 deciles of the 
rescaled income distribution - though at increasing rates as we go the lower in the distribution 
(for instance, compare the bottom decile and bottom percentile in Figure 6b). Therefore, 
while the extent of redistribution estimated by our model is conservative, the nature 
(direction) of such redistribution remains robust to tail (rich) incomes in the income 
distribution.  
4. Discussion 
It is well recognized fact that economic growth is essential for a nation like India to 
effectively combat poverty (Roemer & Gugerty, 1997; Fosu, 2017; Adams Jr., 2004; 
Planning Commission, 1962). Economic growth has been seen as key to the reduction of 
poverty in India over the past 40 years (Deaton & Dreze, 2002; Dhongde, 2007; Panagariya 
& More, 2014; Panagariya & Mukim, 2014), and recognizing that the increased growth may 
indeed be somewhat inequitably distributed, it is argued that the benefits of growth are still 
spread across the income distribution, leaving individuals better off than before (Bhagwati & 
Panagariya, 2013). Kuznets (1955) argued that some level of inequality was inevitable as 
economic growth happened and that redistribution would follow economic growth, though 
there is evidence to suggest that lower inequality benefits economic growth and therefore 
poverty reduction (Fosu, 2017; Lakner, Mahler, Negre, & Prydz, 2019; Alesina & Rodrik, 
1994). Our finding that for the past two decades India has been, and perhaps continue to be, 
in a regressive regime of negative reallocation, where inequality is not just increasing, but 
that there is a degenerate redistribution of income from the bottom to the top, underlines the 
need for a deeper interrogation into the nature of economic growth in India. 
Prior work has studied the fall and rise of economic inequality in India in the context of 
structural economic conditions, developments in the political economy, and global economic 
changes (Banerjee & Piketty, 2005; Chancel & Piketty, 2019; Deaton & Dreze, 2002; Kohli, 
2012; Dev & Ravi, 2007). It is recognized that from 1947, one of the explicit goals of the 
mixed economy under Jawaharlal Nehru was the curbing of elite economic power, and the 
declining share of income of the top 1% (and top 10%) till the early 1980s is found to be 
consistent with the role of socialist policies - such as state ownership of the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy, price regulations, import barriers, and progressive tax structures 
(with very high top marginal rates) - in driving convergence in the income distribution 
(Banerjee & Piketty, 2005; Chancel & Piketty, 2019). Since the early 1980s under Rajiv 
Gandhi and especially in the 1990s under Narasimha Rao and subsequent governments, there 
was a move away from socialism towards economic liberalisation, incorporating a set of 
policies including trade openness, price deregulation, increase in imports, tax reduction 
(especially of top marginal rates), and denationalisation of industry, that resulted in sharp 
increases both in economic growth and income inequality (Banerjee & Piketty, 2005; Kohli, 
2012; Chancel & Piketty, 2019; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2004; Basole, 2014). Our work 
suggests that we have been in a regime of negative redistribution since the early 2000s, and it 
is plausible the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) 
in 2005 by the Manmohan Singh government (Ministry of Rural Development, 2005) has had 
some impact in redressing the extent of this perverse redistribution. While many challenges in 
its implementation are acknowledged, the NREGA program is found have yielded higher 
incomes, higher political participation amongst disadvantaged groups, and improved labour 
force participation especially among women in rural India (Bhatia & Drèze, 2006; Shankar & 
Gaiha, 2013; Azam, 2011; Freud, 2015). The income impact of this program on the rural 
workforce since 2005 could be one possible explanation for the decrease in magnitude of 
negative redistribution by 2015 (although overall redistribution still remains negative). But, 
the NREGA program appears to have been significantly diluted, restricted, and underfunded 
by the NDA government since 2014 (Freud, 2015; Bhalla, 2014), possibly enhancing the risk 
of India remaining in the regime of negative income redistribution for longer. Income data 
post 2014 will be required to confirm subsequent redistribution trends. 
The fundamental structural changes in the Indian economy from the 1980s onward also echo 
broader global trends, which have resulted in the reversal of gains in income inequality in 
nations across the world (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2017; Chancel & 
Piketty, 2019; Assouad, Chancel, & Morgan, 2018). This continues even today with the onset 
of the high technology revolution in the first two decades of the 2000s, which has led to a 
renewed rise in global inequality (Milanovic, 2016), and India appears no exception to this 
trend (Chancel & Piketty, 2019; Deaton & Dreze, 2002; Sarkar & Mehta, 2010). While it has 
meant excess returns for capital (Milanovic, 2016) (there were nine billionaires in India in 
2000, 57 in 2011, and 131 in 2017 as per the Forbes Rich List), it has at the same time 
resulted in the increasing informalization of jobs in the organized sector (Mehrotra, Gandhi, 
Saha, & Sahoo, 2012; NSSO, 2015). This is obvious not only in the nature of employment in 
new-age technology companies (such as Uber, Ola, Swiggy, and Amazon) which provide 
their services through networks of agents who are not directly employed by them (McQuown, 
2016), but also in the increasingly contractual nature of employment in the manufacturing 
sector - where the fraction of contractual employees increased from 16% in 1998-99 to 35% 
in 2014-15 (Mehrotra, Gandhi, Saha, & Sahoo, 2012; NSSO, 2015). The continual 
casualization of the workforce in the formal sector has meant a gradual stripping away of job 
contracts, security and benefits, resulting in diminished possibilities for meaningful worker 
mobilization and organization (Applebaum & Lichtenstein, 2016). 
Nowhere is the stark nature of the India’s extant income distribution more apparent than in 
the agricultural sector, which employs close to 50% of India’s workforce (Dept. of Economic 
Affairs, 2018). It is well recognized that agrarian economic distress has been widespread in 
India since the 1990s (Vakulabharanam & Motiram, 2011; Vaidyanathan, 2006; Reddy & 
Mishra, 2008). This is manifested in the increasing indebtedness of farmers - over half the 
nation’s farmers are indebted, and both incidence and extent of indebtedness have been 
growing over time (Suri, 2006; Narayanamoorthy & Kalamkar, 2005) - primarily on account 
of rising input costs due to removal of public subsidies, output price volatility, and decline in 
public investments (Vakulabharanam & Motiram, 2011; Suri, 2006; Reddy & Mishra, 2008). 
This indebtedness is linked to the increase in the number of marginal and small-hold farmers, 
and to the spate of farmer suicides - over 298,000 farmers committed suicide between 1995 
and 2012 (Kennedy & King, 2014; Nagaraj, Sainath, Rukmani, & Gopinath, 2014; Suri, 
2006; Vaidyanathan, 2006). Given that smallholders and marginal farmers comprise the 
bottom of the income distribution (Sinha, Pearson, Kadekodi, & Gregory, 2017), our findings 
that incomes in the bottom decile and bottom percentile are in continuous and sharp decline 
since the early 2000s corresponds with the broader evidence on deep agrarian distress. If the 
state of negative redistribution (𝜏 < 0) persists over time, it is possible that we may even see 
the emergence of negative incomes at the bottom of the distribution. There is previous 
evidence of negative income observations, as in the case of Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Pyatt, Chen, & Fei, 1980), resulting from household financial losses in agriculture or micro 
and small businesses, because of the absence of any distinction between ‘household income’ 
and ‘business income’ in these informal contexts (Chen, Tsaur, & Rhai, 1982). Consequently, 
if the current negative redistribution trend holds, there is real concern that increasing fractions 
of the workforce at the bottom of India’s income distribution will be net debtors in the 
economic system. 
Given this confluence of global and national trends, there is a need for structural 
interventions to enable a reversal of the extreme inequality evident today. In designing 
responses to address this situation, it is important to remember that India still remains a low-
income country and that there is a need for both continued economic growth as well as 
inequality reduction. A starting point for this would be a recognition that the current Indian 
economic model is leaving a substantial proportion of the population disconnected from the 
growth process – as our work reveals, the three bottom deciles see their income share shrink 
since the early 2000s, with the bottom decile particularly hard hit. Indeed, almost this exact 
recognition of the limitation of economic growth processes was explicated in the Planning 
Commission’s assessment of the development process in newly independent India – they 
estimated that about 20% of the population remained outside of economic development 
processes at the time (in 1961), and would need specific policies to secure their basic 
economic well-being (Planning Commission, 1962). Therefore, the salient question, both then 
and now, is how policy can ensure growth for the largest possible proportion of the 
population while simultaneously enabling meaningful support and redistribution to 
systematically benefit those left behind, so as to reduce inequality.  
It has been argued that the current tide of rising income inequality can be countered by a 
number of strategies such as new forms of political mobilization, taxation policies, universal 
incomes, and sustained increase in public investments (Piketty, 2014; Schiller, 2004; 
Skidelsky & Skidelsky, 2012; Burman, 2014; Glomm & Ravikumar, 2003; Subramanian, 
Belli, & Kawachi, 2002). Schiller (2004), for instance, contends that a progressive tax system 
is an essential bulwark against income inequality, by ensuring that higher earnings are taxed 
at higher rates, but that the system does not respond adequately if income inequality rises and 
become increasingly more extreme (as our work demonstrates in the Indian context). To 
counter such inequality, he proposes a fundamental reform of the tax system by having taxes 
indexed to income inequality. This would mean that the system remains progressive, but most 
importantly, tax rates would endogenously adjust to changes in inequality. Effectively, in 
scenarios of increasing or extreme inequality, the rate of rise in marginal tax rate on the 
highest income brackets will reflect the rate of rise in inequality. Burman (2014) further 
nuances this idea by proposing a progressive tax code integrating inequality indexing with 
inflation indexing, where losses in tax revenue on account of inflation indexing can be offset 
by increased tax revenues from inequality indexing. The nature of this offset due to inequality 
indexing would be that richer tax payers bear more of the burden (and poorer tax payers less) 
in case of worsening inequality. Piketty (2014) also recommends raising the tax rates on the 
highest incomes, as well as increasing inheritance taxes. The Universal Basic Income (UBI), 
where all citizens of a country receive a regular, unconditional sum of money from the 
government, is proposed as a counter to inequality. It is argued that since the lion’s share of 
productivity gains over the past few decades have gone to the richest, a reversal of this trend 
could fund a modest initial basic income (Skidelsky & Skidelsky, 2012). Given the increasing 
threat of automation and the further exacerbation of inequality that this trend could represent, 
a UBI that grows in line with capital productivity would benefit the many instead of 
privileging the few (Skidelsky & Skidelsky, 2012). Significantly increasing public 
investments in education and health so that a reasonable quality of these services is accessible 
to every last citizen is potentially another way to ensure improved long-term redistribution 
outcomes (Subramanian, Belli, & Kawachi, 2002; Glomm & Ravikumar, 2003). 
While the details of specific policy proposals to counter income inequality will vary by 
context, what our work specifically highlights is the need for structural reforms to ensure that 
the divergence of the income distribution is reversed and we are able to return to a 
progressive redistribution regime. 
5. Conclusion 
We attempt to characterize the dynamics of redistribution in the Indian income distribution. 
Milanovic (2016) shows that the rise of modern capitalism after the Industrial Revolution had 
a fundamental impact on the nature of the relationship between average income and income 
inequality. Essentially, both average income and income inequality rise over time and it is 
only for a brief period in the mid-20th century that we see a decline in income inequality 
even as average income increases. The advent of the communications and internet revolutions 
has once again resulted in a continual upward surge in inequality over the past three decades. 
In keeping with global trends, we find that income inequality in India reduces between 1951 
and the early 1980s, beyond which it shows continual increase, which is particularly sharp 
post 2002. 
Given this empirical characterization of the evolution of income post the Industrial 
revolution, we seek to model income evolution as a multiplicative process following 
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). In doing so, we follow the reallocating GBM (RGBM) 
methodology of Berman, Peters, and Adamou (2017), where they incorporate a redistribution 
parameter 𝜏 to the GBM to capture the direction and magnitude of reallocation occurring 
within the distribution. 
Applying the RGBM to Indian income inequality data, we find that there are two distinct 
redistribution regimes: between 1951 and 2002 the reallocation is positive (𝜏 > 0) and 
between 2002 and 2015, the reallocation is distinctly negative (𝜏 < 0). This means that for 
almost the past two decades, India’s income distribution has been in a regime of perverse, 
regressive reallocation, where resources are being redistributed from the poor to the rich. 
Model outcomes suggest that while the entire bottom half of the income distribution has seen 
a shrinking share of income in this time, those at the very bottom have been worst hit, with 
the bottom decile earning just ~1% (and the bottom percentile just ~0.03%) of national 
income in 2015. Essentially, under negative reallocation, the impoverishment of the poorest 
is directly feeding the income gains of the richest. 
We discuss how the nature of India’s economic growth is closely linked to the negative 
redistribution apparent in the income distribution. The increasing informalization of the 
formal workforce in both new-age technology as well as traditional manufacturing sectors has 
meant that workers have been left with no avenues for mobilization. The agricultural 
workforce appears to be the worst hit, with highly volatile incomes, especially of marginal 
and small farmers, combining with rising indebtedness resulting in increased impoverishment 
over time. We argue that the current model of economic development leaves out a significant 
proportion of the population, and that meaningful responses to the situation must consider the 
need for both high economic growth and low income inequality in India. We discuss a 
number of ways to counter inequality such as inequality indexed taxes, increased public 
investments in health and education, and the Universal Basic Income. Overall, it is important 
for us to reconsider and suitably reorient extant models of economic growth so that prosperity 
is more equitably distributed and any economic re-distribution remains progressive. 
Our work has limitations. We also do not model the dynamics of generating the upper tail of 
incomes, which follows a power law, because of our focus on the lognormal portion of the 
distribution. However, incorporating this would provide a more complete model for the entire 
income distribution.  Further work using the RGBM model on alternate measures of income 
inequality such as the Gini coefficient time series for India could help validate our results.  
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